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Abstract. According to the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, the legalization of abortion in the 
United States in the 1970s explains some of the decrease in crime in the 1990s. In this 
paper, I challenge this hypothesis. First, I argue against the intermediate mechanisms 
whereby abortion in the 1970s is supposed to cause a decrease in crime in the 1990s. 
Second, I argue against the correlations that support this causal relationship.  
I. 
 Introduction. According to the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, there is a causal 
connection between the legalization of abortion in the United States in the 1970s and the 
steady decrease in crime in the 1990s. In this paper, I argue for the following two theses: 
(1) a plausible mechanism for this connection has not been offered and (2) the evidence 
for the connection is suggestive but inconclusive. The paper is divided into two main 
sections. In the first, I argue for my first thesis. I canvass some of the main mechanisms 
proposed and explain why I do not think they withstand critical scrutiny. In the second, I 
argue for my second thesis. I review some of the major evidence for the connection and 
argue that although there are some suggestive correlations, the balance of evidence 
militates against the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis. Although my conclusion could serve to 
undermine a key premise in a popular utilitarian argument in favor of abortion, I shall not 
be taking a stand on the morality of abortion or on any of the issues surrounding abortion 
laws (e.g., timing, government funding, etc.).  
II. 
A. 
 The Mechanisms. In order to understand the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, it is useful 
to note two facts. First, reported rates of legal abortions began steadily to increase in the 
United States in the 1970s. A few states made abortion legal under limited circumstances 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  But it was not until Roe v. Wade (in 1973) that 1
 Donohue and Levitt note that between 1967 and 1970, 13 states provided for legal 1
abortion under three conditions: (1) to prevent death or grave mental or physical 
impairment to the mother; (2) if the fetus would be born with grave mental or physical 
defect; and (3) in the case of rape or incest. The states were: Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oregon, South Carolina and Virginia (John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of 
legalized abortion on crime,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116.2 (2001): 
379-420, at 383n4). In addition, five states repealed their antiabortion laws during this 
same time period, making abortion more broadly available. These states were: Alaska, 
California, Hawaii, New York and Washington (ibid., at 383-4). Donohue and Levitt refer 
to these five states as the “early repeal” states. Joyce argues that D.C. should be included 
among the early repealers (Ted Joyce, “Did legalized abortion lower crime?” The Journal 
of Human Resources 39.1 (Winter, 2004): 1-28, at 4n2).
abortion became legal everywhere in the United States.  Second, violent crime, property 2
crime and homicide, perhaps the most reliably measured kind of violent crime, began 
steadily to decrease in the United States in the 1990s. Putting these two facts together, it 
may be seen that there seems to be an inverse relationship between abortion rates and 
crime rates about 20 years later: about 20 years after abortion rates began to increase, 
crime rates began to decrease.   3
 According to the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, if these abortions had not taken place, 
then the resulting children would have increased the crime rates when they grew up. That 
is, the causal connection between abortion and crime posited in the Donohue-Levitt 
hypothesis is not about, for example, the kinds of attitudes and values that might (or 
might not) be promulgated through a society by means of a change in abortion law. 
Rather, the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis is about what the counterfactual children would 
have gone on to do with their lives if they had been carried to term. The fact that the 
 This is an oversimplification. For one thing, it is consistent with Roe v. Wade for a state 2
to outlaw third trimester elective abortions. For another thing, not all states are in 
compliance with Roe v. Wade. Finally, there is an important distinction between a woman 
being legally permitted to get an abortion and a woman having access to abortion 
services. Some of these issues are addressed below. For now, I am trying to paint the 
bigger picture. 
 This is illustrated in figures 12a, 12b and 12c from Angela Dills, Jeffrey Miron and 3
Garret Summers, “What do economists know about crime?” NBER Working Paper Series 
Working Paper 13759. 
correlation shows up around the 20 year mark is, according to Donohue and Levitt, 
important: adolescents around the age of 20 are taken to be in their high crime years, so 
not having them around will have a measurable impact on crime rates. 
 There are two main mechanisms through which legalized abortion is taken to lower 
crime. The first has to do with cohort size (quantity). Even if the fetuses that are aborted 
have the same chances of becoming criminals as those which are carried to term, the fact 
that an abortion results in one less baby means that there will be one less potential 
criminal 20 years later. The second mechanism has to do with selection effects (quality). 
If the fetuses that are aborted are at greater risk of becoming criminals (e.g., because of 
the environment in which they would have grown up) than those which are carried to 
term, then even if the cohort size stays the same, there will be fewer criminals. These two 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive: legalizing abortion might reduce crime by 
bringing about a smaller cohort whose members are at lower risk of becoming criminals 
than the aborted fetuses would have been.  
 Before I discuss these mechanisms in greater detail, I want to make two points. 
First, both of these mechanisms have been appealed to in other discussions of crime 
trends. For example, Blumenstein, Cohen and Miller used demographic data to predict 
that crime levels would decrease in the 1980s because of smaller cohort sizes.  Similarly, 4
DiIulio predicted that crime would rise from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s based 
in part on the qualities of the cohort that would be coming of age.  The word 5
“superpredator” was coined in this discussion to refer to a youth who, perhaps because of 
a bad upbringing, has unusually high criminogenic propensities.  
 Second, selection effects from legalizing abortion have been appealed to outside of 
discussions of crime trends. For example, Gruber, Levine and Staiger observe that 
legalizing abortion could have selection effects in at least two different ways. On the one 
hand, if women use abortion to avoid bearing children into adverse conditions, then 
positive selection will result; on the other hand, if the most disadvantaged women are 
 Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, Harold Miller, “Demographically disaggregated 4
projections of prison populations,” Journal of Criminal Justice 8.1 (1980): 1-26. It should 
be noted that their model also appeals to demographic changes in the composition of the 
cohort: it is not purely based on cohort size. But the fact that cohort size has played a role 
in these debates (independently of the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis) is all that I am trying 
to establish.
 John DiIulio, “The Coming of the Super-Predators,”The Weekly Standard 1.11 (Nov. 27, 5
1995).
constrained in their abortion access, then negative selection will result.  In order to 6
determine whether positive or negative selection is more prevalent, Gruber, Levine and 
Staiger use data from the 5 percent Public Use Micro Sample of the 1980 Census and the 
U.S. Vital Statistics. They conclude: 
…the marginal children who were not born as a result of abortion 
legalization would have systematically been born into less favorable 
circumstances if the pregnancies had not been terminated: they would 
have been 60 percent more likely to live in a single-parent household, 50 
percent more likely to live in poverty, 45 percent more likely to be in a 
household collecting welfare, and 40 percent more likely to die during the 
 Jonathan Gruber, Phillip Levine and Douglas Staiger, “Abortion Legalization and Child 6
Living Circumstances: Who is the ‘Marginal Child’?” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 114.1 (Feb., 1999): 263-91, especially p. 264: “On the one hand, if women 
use abortion to avoid bearing children into adverse circumstances, positive selection 
would result: the living circumstances of the marginal child are not so good as those of 
the average child, so that increased abortion access will raise average living standards of 
the children who are born. On the other hand, negative selection would result if, for 
instance, the most disadvantaged women are constrained in their abortion access, either 
geographically or financially. In this case, the living circumstances of the marginal child 
would be more advantageous than those of the average child, and abortion legalization 
may reduce the living standards of those children who are born.”
first year of life.   7
From this it may be seen that there is a first-order, inverse relationship between abortion 
and crime and that there is a precedent for the mechanisms used by Donohue and Levitt 
to explain this relationship. In the remainder of this section, I shall examine these 
mechanisms in more detail. I shall begin with cohort size. After that, I shall turn to 
selection effects. The particular selection effects on which I shall focus are: wantedness, 
birthweight, race, single parenthood, age, socioeconomic status and education.  
B. 
 Cohort Size. Donohue and Levitt note that legalization of abortion in the United 
States “is associated with roughly a 5 percent drop in birth rates.”  All else being equal, a 8
drop in birth rates would lead to a drop in cohort size. A smaller cohort size then could 
lead to a subsequent drop in crime rates in one of two ways. First, the size of the cohort 
might impact its quality. For example, if a reduction in cohort size leads to smaller class 
sizes in schools, then teachers might be able to devote more time and energy to each 
individual student. Increased investment on the part of teachers and others might reduce 
 Ibidem, p. 265.7
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 8
386. In Freakonomics, this number is given as 6%: “…the legalization of abortion had 
myriad consequences…births actually fell by 6 percent…” (Steven Levitt and Stephen 
Dubner, Freakonomics (New York: Harper Collins, 2005), p. 127). No source is given for 
this number in Freakonomics.
the chances that a child will engage in criminal activity later in life.  Second, even if 9
reducing cohort size does not reduce the chances that a child will engage in criminal 
activity later in life, provided it does not increase these chances, “[w]hen those smaller 
cohorts reach the high-crime late adolescent years, there are simply fewer people to 
 Donohue and Levitt hint at this hypothesis in a discussion of how long it should take for 9
the reductions in crime from legalized abortion to manifest: “[i]f women who already had 
children in 1973 used abortion to prevent increases in family size, then abortion may 
indirectly lower criminality for the remaining children who will receive greater per child 
contributions of family resources” (John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of 
legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., 393n19). The way in which cohort size might impact 
cohort quality is discussed under the rubric of “crowding effects” in more detail in 
Cristian Pop-Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of 
Children: Evidence from Romania,” Journal of Political Economy 114.4 (2006): 744-73, 
especially p. 747: “…if the fertility impact of the ban on abortions is large, one could 
imagine a negative crowding effect resulting form a larger cohort competing for scarce 
resources.” See also Theodore Joyce, Robert Kaestner and Sanders Korenman, “The 
effect of pregnancy intention on child development,” Demography 37.1 (Feb., 2000): 
83-94, especially p. 85, and Gary Becker and H. Gregg Lewis, “On the Interaction 
between the Quantity and Quality of Children,” Journal of Political Economy 81.2 (Mar.-
Apr., 1973): S279-88.
commit crime.”   10
 Note that for this argument to hold, two things must be true. First, cohort sizes 
would have to begin to decrease in the 1970s and, in particular, around 1973. This is 
because the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis is not supposed to be merely a counterfactual, 
predictive hypothesis: the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis is supposed to be an explanatory 
hypothesis. In particular, it is supposed to explain why crimes steadily dropped beginning 
around 1991. If it does so through cohort size, then it follows that post-legal-abortion 
cohorts must be smaller than pre-legal-abortion cohorts.  
 Second, this reduction in cohort size must be due to abortion. For example, if it 
could be established that cohort sizes were smaller but that this was due solely to 
emigration, then it is difficult to see how the connection between reduced crime and 
abortion could be mediated by the mechanism of reduced cohort size. This is why 
Donohue and Levitt are careful to point out that legalization of abortion is associated with 
a drop in birth rate.  
 Now I would like to make two points in response to this argument. First, the 5 
percent drop is estimated by comparing fertility rates between states that varied in the 
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 10
386. They argue that this is the “simplest way in which legalized abortion reduces 
crime” (ibid.). It is worth pointing out that this second version of the cohort size 
mechanism could work even if reducing cohort size in some way increased criminogenic 
propensities (e.g., through a sort of “converse crowding effect” if added time and energy 
investment from adults were in some way smothering). 
timing of abortion legalization.  However, natality data from Vital Statistics of the 11
United States 1979 indicate a more nuanced story.  Registered births decreased by 3.7% 12
in 1973 when abortion was legalized nationwide. However, they then increased by 0.7% 
in 1974; decreased by 0.5% in 1975; and after that steadily increased until 1979. In 1979 
there were 3,494,398 registered births, an increase of more than 200,000 over the 1972 
numbers (3,258,411). Birth rates follow a similar pattern: they decreased from 15.6 to 
 Donohue and Levitt cite P. Levine, D. Staiger, T.J. Kane and D.J. Zimmerman, “Roe v. 11
Wade and American Fertility,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
No. 5616, June 1996. The working paper has been published since that time: Phillip 
Levine, Douglas Staiger, Thomas Kane and David Zimmerman, “Roe v. Wade and 
American Fertility,” American Journal of Public Health 89.2 (1999): 199-203. The 
sentence to which this footnote is appended is copied from the “Methods” from this 
paper. Levine et al. are careful to note that there are potentially confounding effects from 
more widely available contraceptives during this time period.
 This point is made in Franklin Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline (Oxford: 12
Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 93-4.
14.9 in 1973 and then ended up climbing to 15.9 in 1979.   13
 I turn now to my second point: demographic data from the 1990s also militate 
against reduced cohort sizes as the mechanism underlying the connection between 
legalized abortion and crime reduction. In particular, resident population estimates by age 
from the United States Census Bureau indicate that the 14-17 year old cohort increased in 
size every year from July 1990 (13,322,000) to November 2000 (15,743,000); the 18-24 
year old cohort decreased by about 2 million from July 1990 (26,835,000) to July 1996 
(24,843,000) and then increased steadily by almost the same amount by November 2000 
 It might be wondered how to make sense of the fact that the number of registered births 13
was increasing in tandem with the number of abortions. But as Joyce points out, 
legalizing abortion might lead to an increase in unwanted pregnancies (Ted Joyce, “Did 
Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?” ibid., p. 6). In Freakonomics it is pointed out that 
“conceptions rose by nearly 30%” after abortion was legalized (Steven Levitt and 
Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 127. No source is given for this number in the 
endnotes). One hypothesis that would explain this increase in conceptions is that legal 
access to abortion leads people to be more irresponsible in their sexual behavior. The idea 
is that legalizing abortion decreases some of the risks associated with irresponsible sexual 
behavior and therefore decreases the incentive for avoiding such behavior. This 
hypothesis is bolstered by data from the CDC, which indicate that gonorrhea and syphilis 
incidences are significantly and positively correlated with abortion legalization (Jonathan 
Klick and Thomas Stratmann, “The effect of abortion legalization on the incidence of 
Sexually Transmitted Diseases,” Law and Economics Working Paper Series 02-11). 
(26,748,000). 
 It might be objected that had abortion not been legalized in 1973, there would have 
been more births in the 1970s and larger cohorts in the 1990s. On these grounds, one 
might think that the cohort size mechanism is not threatened by the data cited in the 
previous two paragraphs: crime would have been higher in the 1990s on account of the 
larger cohorts that would have been coming of age if abortion had not been legalized, and 
natality and demographic data are irrelevant. But this mistakes the nature of the 
Donohue-Levitt hypothesis. Again: the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis does not say merely 
counterfactually that crime would have been higher if abortion had not been legalized. 
The Donohue-Levitt hypothesis states that the actual decrease in crime observed in the 
1990s after the 1991 crime peak was due in part to the legalization of abortion. Consider, 
for example, the following passage from the conclusion of their original paper:  
The evidence we present is consistent with legalized abortion reducing 
crime rates with a twenty-year lag. Our results suggest that an increase of 
100 abortions per 1000 live births reduces a cohort’s crime by roughly 10 
percent…These estimates suggest that legalized abortion is a primary 
explanation for the large drops in murder, property crime, and violent 
crime that our nation has experienced over the last decade. Indeed, 
legalized abortion may account for as much as one-half of the overall 
crime reduction.   14
From this it may be seen that the data reproduced above is prima facie inconsistent with 
the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis if it rests on a cohort size mechanism.  I turn now to 15
selection effects. I begin with wantedness. 
C. 
 Wantedness. The basic idea behind the wantedness mechanism is that legalized 
abortion leads to fewer unwanted babies being born. In their original paper, Donohue and 
Levitt argue that “[t]he impact of unwantedness is large because abortion rates of 
unwanted pregnancies are very high, whereas wanted pregnancies are by definition not 
aborted.”  In subsequent publications, Donohue and Levitt seem to suggest that this is 16
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 14
414.
 Zimring makes a similar point (see Franklin Zimring, The Great American Crime 15
Decline, ibid., p. 97).
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 16
390.
the main mechanism underlying the connection between abortion and crime reduction.  17
The reason reducing unwanted pregnancies reduces crime is that unwanted babies are 
more likely to suffer abuse and neglect, and children who have suffered abuse and neglect 
are at an increased risk for criminal involvement later in life. To support this idea, 
Donohue and Levitt cite studies of European women who sought but were denied the 
right to have an abortion in jurisdictions where governmental approval was required: 
according to these studies, “these women overwhelmingly kept their babies, rather than 
giving them up for adoption, but…they often resented the unwanted children and were far 
less likely than other mothers to nurture, hold, and breastfeed these children.”  Levitt 18
sums up the argument in an exchange in Slate:  
 See, for example, John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “Further Evidence That Legalized 17
Abortion Lowered Crime: A Reply to Joyce,” The Journal of Human Resources 39.1 
(Winter, 2004): 29-49, especially p. 30: “Donohue and Levitt (2001) present five pieces 
of evidence consistent with the hypothesis that cohorts born after the legalization of 
abortion have lower crime rates because legalized abortion reduces the number of 
unwanted children, who are at higher risk of engaging in criminal conduct when they 
grow up.”
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 18
388. These claims are also made in Freakonomics: after citing the same studies, Levitt 
and Dubner assert that “[r]esearchers found that in the instances where the woman was 
denied an abortion, she often resented her baby and failed to provide it with a good 
home” (Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 124). 
The theoretical justification for our argument rests on two simple 
assumptions: 1) Legalized abortion leads to fewer “unwanted” babies 
being born, and 2) unwanted babies are more likely to suffer abuse and 
neglect and are therefore at an increased risk for criminal involvement 
later in life.   19
If there are fewer children who are at increased risk for criminal involvement later in life, 
then crime rates will decrease, so it follows that legalized abortion reduces crime rates.  
 I would like to examine, first, the connection between unwantedness and abuse and, 
second, the decrease in abuse and neglect that this argument requires. I shall say six 
things about the first and two things about the second. I shall begin by questioning the 
argument above.  
 Steven Levitt and Steven Sailer, “Does Abortion Prevent Crime,” Slate (Aug. 24, 19
1999). For a similar statement of the argument, see Steven Levitt, “Understanding Why 
Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not,” 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18.1 (Winter 2004): 163-90, especially pp. 181-2: 
“The underlying theory rests on two premises: 1) unwanted children are at greater risk for 
crime, and 2) legalized abortion leads to a reduction in the number of unwanted births.” 
See also Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 127: “Legalized 
abortion led to less unwantedness; unwantedness leads to high crime; legalized abortion, 
therefore, led to less crime.”
 First, Donohue and Levitt seem to use the wanted-unwanted distinction to track 
whether a woman desires to carry a pregnancy to term: in the quotation above, they claim 
that “wanted pregnancies are by definition not aborted.” Similarly, in the Slate exchange 
quoted above, Levitt goes on to argue “…that abortion reduces the number of unwanted 
children, is true virtually by definition.” But for one thing, a woman might be conflicted 
or not acting fully rationally when she decides to get an abortion. These decisions might 
be complicated. Finer notes that “8% of pregnancies ending in abortion that women 
reported in the face-to-face interviews for the 2002 NSFG [National Survey of Family 
Growth] were described as intended.”  For another thing, a woman’s desire to have a 20
baby should not be confused with her desire to care for a baby to which she has given 
birth. A study of women whose applications for therapeutic abortions in Sweden in 1948 
were denied found that 81% of those who gave birth reported being satisfied with the 
way things had turned out.  A more realistic psychology (allowing for phenomena like 21
adaptive preference formation) might make more tenuous the connection between not 
being able to get a desired abortion and abuse and neglect. 
 Lawrence Finer and Stanley Henshaw, “Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy 20
in the United States, 1994 and 2001,” Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 
38.2 (Jun., 2006): 90-6, at 91.
 Kerstin Hock, “Refused Abortion. A Follow-Up Study of 249 Women Whose 21
Applications Were Refused by the National Board of Health in Sweden,” Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica Supplementum 38.S168: 7-156. The conclusions are 
summarized on pages 123-31.
 Second, as noted by Donohue and Levitt, the studies they cite to support the 
wantedness mechanism focus on women whose abortion petitions were rejected. Some of 
the studies focus on women whose abortion petitions were rejected twice (for the same 
pregnancy).  But filing for a petition seems like the kind of thing that would disturb the 22
“system” under consideration in a nontrivial way: it might make one question whether the 
results from these studies generalize well to a pregnant woman who desires but is not 
allowed to get an abortion because the procedure is generally illegal.  To corroborate this 23
hesitancy at generalization, it might be noted that in a study comparing cohorts born 
immediately before and immediately after a ban on abortion took effect in Romania, it 
was found that the post-ban cohort attained more years of schooling and greater labor 
market success than the pre-ban cohort (despite being born only months apart). Post-ban 
 For example, see Z. Matejcek, Z. Dytrych and V. Schuller, “The Prague study of 22
children born from unwanted pregnancies,” International Journal of Mental Health 7.3/4 
(Fall-Winter, 1978/79): 63-77, which is one of the studies reviewed in Paul Dagg, “The 
Psychological Sequelae of Therapeutic Abortion—Denied and Completed,” The 
American Journal of Psychiatry 148.5 (May, 1991): 578-85. Dagg’s review article is 
cited in John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” 
ibid., p. 388 and Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 299.
 At the very least, the operational definition of wantedness used in these studies does 23
not generalize to the connection of abortion and crime proposed by Donohue and Levitt.
cohorts also had lower crime rates than pre-ban cohorts.  I shall discuss this study in 24
more detail below, but these results suggest that members of the post-ban cohort were not 
subject to greater levels of criminogenic abuse or neglect than the pre-ban cohort.  
 The third thing I would like to say also has to do with the petitions: the reason that 
women in these studies were required to submit petitions is that the jurisdictions in which 
they lived had made legal only therapeutic abortion. In the US, by way of contrast, Roe v. 
Wade legalized elective abortion. It is true that the women in these studies were denied 
therapeutic abortions. But if one assumes that these women would not have applied (in 
some cases twice) if they did not have some objective grounds for thinking that their 
petitions were reasonable, then, again, it becomes difficult to generalize any results about 
whether their children were abused or neglected to the children of women who would not 
have been able to get elective abortions in the US had Roe v. Wade not happened.  
 Fourth, overlooking the difficulties raised in the previous two paragraphs and with 
due respect to Donohue and Levitt (and Dubner), I contend that the results from these 
studies do not give strong support for the wantedness mechanism. Many of the studies 
find that “the ascertained differences [between wanted children and unwanted children] 
are not particularly dramatic or remarkable”  or that “[t]he unwanted children agreed 25
 Cristian Pop-Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of 24
Children: Evidence from Romania,” Journal of Political Economy, ibid.
 Z. Matejcek, Z. Dytrych and V. Schuller, “The Prague study of children born from 25
unwanted pregnancies,” ibid., p. 75.
with the controls in most respects.”  A study that followed these children into their 30s 26
found that “the differences [between wanted and unwanted children] are no longer 
statistically significant with regard to registration for criminality, alcohol and drug abuse 
and neglect of children.”  Furthermore, these studies often hypothesize that observed 27
differences are due to factors like living in a single parent household rather than increased 
rates of abuse or neglect. Thus, these studies might provide better evidence for the single 
parenthood mechanism (discussed below) than for the wantedness mechanism. Indeed, 
the study just mentioned that followed the children into their 30s found that the 
differences between wanted and unwanted children were further attenuated when they 
controlled for family fixed effects by looking at the siblings of these children, suggesting 
that the differences between wanted and unwanted children were due to genetic or 
environmental differences that might not be immediately connected with wantedness.   28
 The fifth point I want to make concerns the direction of the causal relationship 
 M. Hultin and J. O. Ottoson, “Perinatal conditions of unwanted children,” Acta 26
Psychiatrica Scandinavica 47.S221 (March, 1971): 59-76, at 69.
 L. Kubicka, Z Matejcek, HP David, Z Dytrych, WB Miller, Z Roth, “Children from 27
unwanted pregnancies in Prague, Czech Republic revisited at age thirty,” Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica 91.6 (June, 1995): 361-9, at 367. 
 L. Kubicka, Z Matejcek, HP David, Z Dytrych, WB Miller, Z Roth, “Children from 28
unwanted pregnancies in Prague, Czech Republic revisited at age thirty,” ibid., especially 
pp. 367-8. A similar point is made in Theodore J. Joyce, “Abortion and Crime: A review,” 
ibid., p. 8.
between abortion and subsequent abuse and/or neglect of children. A 1985 study of the 
mothers of 532 children reported to the Baltimore Department of Social Services as 
physically abused during the years 1975-7 found that mothers in maltreating families 
were significantly more likely to have had a stillbirth or reported abortion or a prior child 
death.  These findings were duplicated and expanded upon in later studies.  The 29 30
explanation offered by the authors of these later studies is that an abortion interferes with 
the parent-infant bonding process between a mother and children resulting from 
subsequent pregnancies. The authors argue that getting an abortion might lead a mother 
to engage in abusive and/or neglectful behavior with subsequent children. If this 
explanation is correct, then it poses a problem for the wantedness mechanism.  
 The sixth and final point I would like to make about the connection between 
unwantedness and abuse has two parts. The first has to do with the fact that a woman 
 Mary Benedict, Roger White, Donald Cornely, “Maternal Perinatal Risk Factors and 29
Child Abuse,” Child Abuse and Neglect 9 (1985): 217-24.
 Philip Ney, Tak Fung, Adele Rose Wickett, “Relationship between induced abortion 30
and Child Abuse and Neglect: Four studies,” Pre- and Peri-natal Psychology Journal 8.1 
(1993): 43-63. 
might get an abortion in order to delay rather than to avoid pregnancy.  Recent studies of 31
why women undergo abortion reveal that the most commonly cited “most important 
reason” is that the women are not ready for a(nother) child/that the timing is wrong (27% 
in 1987 and 25% in 2004). This suggests that these women might go on to have a full-
term pregnancy later.  That this might have been happening in the 1970s is supported by 32
the fact that fertility rates, which had been dropping continuously since 1957, remained 
steady after 1973. The second part of this is that a recent study of the effect of pregnancy 
 Donohue and Levitt are careful to point this out. See John Donohue and Steven Levitt, 31
“The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 381 or 386n9. See also John 
Donohue and Steven Levitt, “Further Evidence That Legalized Abortion Lowered Crime: 
A Reply to Joyce,” ibid., p. 33: “As long as the number of unwanted births falls, even if 
total births do not decline at all, one would expect to see better life outcomes on average 
for the resulting cohorts.” Note that if a woman gets an abortion in 1973 because she is 
not ready to have a baby and then subsequently carries a pregnancy to term a few years 
later, her lifetime fertility would not be decreased by the abortion. Thus, it is not the case 
that Donohue and Levitt have to demonstrate a “negative relationship between state 
abortion rates and state fertility rates” in order to demonstrate an increase in unwanted 
childbearing (pace Ted Joyce, “Further Tests of Abortion and Crime,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 10564 (June, 2004), at 15).
 Lawrence Finer, Lori Frohwirth, Lindsay Dauphinee, Susheela Singh, Ann Moore, 32
“Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives,” 
Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 37.3 (2005): 110-8.
intention on maternal behavior and child development found that there are no significant 
differences in maternal behaviors (such as breast feeding and heavy smoking) between 
mistimed and wanted pregnancies.  The fact that mistimed pregnancies are not 33
associated with adverse maternal behavior is problematic for the wantedness mechanism, 
for this mechanism hinges on the idea that if aborted pregnancies had been carried to 
term, they would be more likely than other children to be abused.  
 I now turn to the two points I want to make about the decrease in abuse and neglect 
required by the wantedness mechanism. First, according to the National Center on Child 
 Theodore Joyce, Robert Kaestner and Sanders Korenman, “The effect of pregnancy 33
intention on child development,” ibid.. See also Theodore J. Joyce, “Abortion and Crime: 
A review,” ibid., p. 7. This study is notable because it uses a multivariate analysis that 
controls for potentially confounding variables like the socioeconomic status of the 
mother. It also is notable because unlike some previous studies it distinguishes not only 
between intended and unintended pregnancies but also, within unintended pregnancies, 
between unwanted pregnancies and mistimed pregnancies. This distinction comes from 
the practice of demographers who divide unintended pregnancies into two categories: 
those where a woman wanted to become pregnant at some time in the future but not yet 
(mistimed), and those where a woman did not want to become pregnant now or in the 
future (unwanted) (see, for example, Lawrence Finer and Stanley Henshaw, “Disparities 
in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001,” Perspectives on 
Sexual and Reproductive Health 38.2 (June, 2006): 90-6, especially p. 91. See also 
Theodore J. Joyce, “Abortion and Crime: A review,” ibid., 5n7). 
Abuse and Neglect, between the first National Incidence Study (conducted in 1979-80) 
and the second (1986-87), countable cases of maltreatment increased by 66%; the rate of 
physical abuse increased by 58%; the rate of sexual abuse increased by 300%; and the 
rate of moderate injury from maltreatment increased by 89%. Moving from the second 
study to the third (conducted in 1993-96) there is a statistically significant increase in all 
categories of maltreatment in both the rates and the total numbers of children harmed. 
These data do not go back far enough to make comparisons between pre-Roe v. Wade and 
post-Roe v. Wade cohorts. However, they do go back far enough to pose a problem for the 
wantedness mechanism. Because the wantedness mechanism relies on increased rates of 
abortion ushering in decreasing rates of abuse or neglect as the stepping stone to 
decreasing rates of crime, it seems to presuppose both that child abuse in the 70s would 
be lower than child abuse in the 60s and that child abuse at the turn of the 70s would be 
lower than that in the mid-80s: to explain a continuous decrease in crime in the 90s and 
through the 2000s by means of the wantedness mechanism, there must be a 
corresponding decrease in abuse and neglect in the 80s and 90s. Thus, these data suggest 
that the decrease in abuse and neglect required by the wantedness mechanism might not 
have taken place. In corroboration of this it might be noted that a study of reports to child 
protection agencies from January 1, 1965 to December 31, 1984 found a steady increase 
in child abuse during this 20 year time period. Although this study looks only at a single 
county in Indiana (unlike the National Incidence Studies), it is notable for two reasons: 
first, it enables comparison of pre-Roe v. Wade cohorts with post-Roe v. Wade cohorts; 
and second, the author tries to control for the changing definitions of child abuse during 
this time period. The study concludes that “[d]espite the expansion of the definition of 
child maltreatment that appears to be involved in these data, evidence points to a genuine 
increase in violence, molestation, or neglect of children.”  Again, this suggests that the 34
decrease in abuse and neglect required by the wantedness mechanism did not take place. 
 The final point I shall make in this section concerns infant mortality. A study of US 
mortality data for children under 5 years of age shows that there is no statistically 
significant drop in the number of homicides of under 1 year old infants correlated with 
Roe v. Wade, and there has been a steady increase in the number of homicides of 1-4 year 
olds since at least 1960.  The authors of the study conclude that the legalization of 35
abortion is not associated with a sudden change in trends associated with homicides of 
children under 5 years of age.  But if legalizing abortion leads to a decrease in unwanted 36
babies and if a decrease in unwanted babies leads to a decrease in abuse and neglect, one 
 Dean Knudson, “Child Maltreatment over Two Decades: Change or Continuity?” 34
Violence and Victims 3.2 (1988): 129-144, at 143.
 The rate of increase of homicides of 1-4 year olds decreases slightly in 1975, but it is 35
useful to recall the point made above about “early repeal” states: 1975 is (at least prima 
facie) too late for a change in homicides of 1-4 year olds to be attributable to legalized 
abortion. Zimring also discusses this point (see Franklin Zimring, The Great American 
Crime Decline, ibid., p. 92).
 Susan Sorenson, Douglas Wiebe and Richard Berk, “Legalized Abortion and the 36
Homicide of Young Children: An Empirical Investigation,” Analyses of Social Issues and 
Public Policy 2.1 (2002): 239-56.
also might expect that a decrease in abortion would lead to a decrease in infant 
homicides.   37
 The fact that there is neither a decrease in abuse or neglect when post-Roe v. Wade 
cohorts are coming of age nor a decrease in infant homicides when these cohorts are 
infants seems to militate against the idea that legalized abortion ushered in a decrease in 
criminogenic abuse and neglect. Note that (as with the cohort mechanism) it will not 
suffice for the wantedness mechanism to say that rates of abuse and neglect would have 
been higher during these times if abortion had been illegal: to explain an actual decrease 
in crime by means of the wantedness mechanism, there must be an actual decrease in 
abuse or neglect. Based on the foregoing, it seems to me that the balance of evidence tells 
against (or at least does not tell in favor of) the wantedness mechanism. I now turn to an 
examination of other selection effects proposed by Donohue and Levitt.  
 This connection is drawn in Susan Sorenson, Douglas Wiebe and Richard Berk, 37
“Legalized Abortion and the Homicide of Young Children: An Empirical Investigation,” 
ibid., p. 243: “One could logically assert that the homicides of infants might be reduced 
because they would be more likely to be born into a household in which they are wanted 
and in which resources are perceived to be adequate for their care.” It is also notable that 
the factors that Sorenson et al. list as increasing the chances of a child being a homicide 
victim are the same as those listed by Donohue and Levitt as increasing the chances of a 
child growing up to become a criminal: “A young child is more likely to be a homicide 
victim if the mother is unmarried, a teenager, or has not graduated from high 
school” (ibid., p. 241).
D. 
 Birthweight. In their original paper, Donohue and Levitt note that “[a] number of 
studies have shown that the availability of abortion improves infant outcomes by 
reducing the number of low birthweight babies and neonatal mortality.”  In a follow-up 38
article, they make a similar point and conclude that “if legalizing abortion has a positive 
effect on birth outcomes then…it should not be surprising that legalizing abortion would 
have a positive effect on life outcomes such as criminal activity as well.”  Birthweight 39
also factors into a discussion of parenting in Freakonomics.  In support of this, a study in 40
the early 2000s found a correlation between low birthweight and higher rates of chronic 
conditions and of neurosensory impairment. The same study also shows that very low 
birthweight infants have significantly lower mean IQ scores and scores on various 
subtests of academic achievement than other infants.   41
 However, there are three points that should be made in response to this. First, the 
fact that neonatal mortality decreases when abortion is available seems like it should 
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 38
387, see also p. 414.
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “Further Evidence That Legalized Abortion Lowered 39
Crime: A Reply to Joyce,” ibid., p. 38.
 Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., chapter 5.40
 Maureen Hack, Daniel Flannery, Mark Schluchter, Lydia Cartar, Elaine Borawski, 41
Nancy Klein, “Outcomes in Young Adulthood for Very-Low-Birth-Weight Infants,” New 
England Journal of Medicine 346 (2002): 149-57.
discount (rather than favorably augment) the cohort size and other mechanisms proposed 
by Donohue and Levitt. Second, a more recent study (than those cited by Donohue and 
Levitt) that controls for family background finds relatively weak support for the 
hypothesis that unintended pregnancy is associated with poor infant health.  Third and 42
finally, when it comes to criminal activity, which is what is of interest for the Donohue-
Levitt hypothesis, the study from the early 2000s cited above shows that there are no 
significant differences between the very low birthweight group and the normal 
birthweight group in the rates of conviction for a crime or incarceration in jail or juvenile 
detention. In fact, fewer very low birthweight men than male controls had ever had 
contact with the police, and the very low birthweight participants reported significantly 
lower rates of alcohol and marijuana use than the controls.  This militates against the 43
birthweight mechanism. 
E. 
 Race. The race mechanism begins by noting that blacks account for a 
disproportionate amount of criminal activity. For example, according to data released by 
the FBI, 49.74% of arrests for murder and non-negligent manslaughter in 2011 were 
black. But in that same year, according to the US census bureau, blacks made up only 
13.1% of the population. However, blacks also account for a disproportionate number of 
 Theodore J. Joyce, Robert Kaestner and Sanders Korenman, “The Effect of Pregnancy 42
Intention on Child Development,” Demography 37.1 (Feb., 2000): 83-94.
  Maureen Hack, Daniel Flannery, Mark Schluchter, Lydia Cartar, Elaine Borawski, 43
Nancy Klein, “Outcomes in Young Adulthood for Very-Low-Birth-Weight Infants,” ibid.
abortions. For example, in 1994, 30% of all abortions in the US were given to black 
women. This meant that the rate of abortions for black women was 54 (per 1000 women 
of reproductive age) in 1994, the highest rate based on race in that year. (White women 
had a rate of 16 that year.) Moreover, 1994 was not an anomalous year in that regard: in 
2000, 31.7% of all abortions in the US were given to black women. The rate of abortions 
for black women that year was 49, again the highest rate based on race. (In the same year, 
the rate of abortions for white women was 13.)  Donohue and Levitt explain this as 44
follows: 
Fertility declines for black women are three times greater than for 
whites…Given that homicide rates of black youths are roughly nine times 
higher than those of white youths, racial differences in the fertility effects 
of abortion are likely to translate into greater homicide reductions.   45
 Rachel Jones, Jacqueline Darroch and Stanley Henshaw, “Patterns in the 44
socioeconomic characteristics of women obtaining abortions in 2000-2001,” Perspectives 
on Sexual and Reproductive Health 34.5 (2002): 226-35 and Rachel K. Jones and Megan 
Kavanaugh, “Changes in Abortion Rates Between 2000 and 2008 and Lifetime Incidence 
of Abortion,” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 117.6 (2011): 1358-66.
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 45
390.
Race is sometimes taken as a proxy for socioeconomic status in this context.  But there 46
could be something else going on. For example, there could be systematic bias in the 
penal system against blacks. For that reason, I follow Donohue and Levitt in treating the 
race mechanism separately from the socioeconomic mechanism. There are at least two 
points worth making about the race mechanism.  
 First, according to Vital Statistics data, the percent of births to black women has 
increased steadily since at least 1960: in 1960, approximately 14% of registered births 
were to black women; in 1970, that number was 15.3%; in 1974 it was 16.0%; and by 
1979 it was 16.5%.  Second and similarly, according to US Census data, blacks have 47
increased continuously in both absolute numbers and as a percent of the population since 
1930. In 1970, there were 22.6 million blacks (11.1% of the population); by 1990, that 
number had climbed to 30 million (12.1% of the population).  This should be 48
unsurprising because birth rates for black women remained consistently higher than those 
for white women during the 1970s. But it does raise a problem for the race mechanism: 
Donohue and Levitt are arguing that abortion leads to a lower percentage of blacks in the 
population and this (perhaps by appeal to socioeconomics, perhaps bias, perhaps 
something else) explains the decrease in crime; this argument looks difficult to maintain 
 See, for example, Franklin Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline, ibid., p. 95.46
 Zimring makes a similar point (Franklin Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline, 47
ibid., pp. 94-5).
 “We the Americans: Blacks,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics 48
Administration, Bureau of the Census, Issued September 1993.
in light of the fact that the percentage of blacks actually increased.  49
F. 
 Single Parenthood. The single parenthood mechanism begins by noting that 
unmarried women get more abortions than married women. For example, in 2000 married 
women accounted for only 17% of abortions. In that same year, women who were 
unmarried and were not cohabiting with their partners accounted for 57.5% of abortions. 
In 2008, married women accounted for only 14.8% of abortions; in that same year, 
women who were unmarried and were not cohabiting accounted for 56% of abortions.  50
But growing up in a single parent household makes it more likely that a child will engage 
in crime. Therefore, by decreasing the percentage of children growing up in single parent 
households, legalizing abortion decreases crime. Donohue and Levitt explain the single 
parenthood mechanism together with the age mechanism (which I shall discuss separately 
below):  
Teenagers and unwed women experience reductions in fertility of 13 and 7 
 Levitt seems to be aware of this: in a 2004 publication he states that “between 1990 49
and 2000, the black population rose from 12.1 percent to 12.9 percent” (Steven Levitt, 
“Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and 
Six That Do Not,” ibid., p. 171). It is unclear whether he realizes that this poses a 
problem for the race mechanism.
 Rachel K. Jones, Lawrence B. Finer and Susheela Singh, Characteristics of U.S. 50
Abortion Patients, 2008, New York: Guttmacher Institute, 2010.
percent, respectively, well above that for non-teenage, married women. 
Rasanen et al. [1999] find, after controlling for other characteristics, that 
having a teenage mother roughly doubles a child’s propensity to commit 
crime, as does growing up with a single parent. Accounting for these two 
factors raises the estimated impact of abortion on homicide from 8.9 
percent to 12.5 percent.   51
The single parenthood mechanism also is appealed to in Freakonomics.  Levitt and 52
Dubner then propose a way in which the crime reduction benefits from the single 
parenthood mechanism and the age mechanism are compounded through time: the 
aborted baby boys of single, teenage mothers will not grow up to commit crimes, and the 
aborted baby girls of single, teenage mothers will not grow up to become single, teenage 
mothers who will give birth to more future criminals:  
And the post-Roe cohort was not only missing thousands of young male 
criminals but also thousands of single, teenage mothers—for many of the 
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 51
390.
 Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., pp. 126-127: “One study has 52
shown that the typical child who went unborn in the earliest years of legalized abortion 
would have been…60 percent more likely to grow up with just one parent…Growing up 
in a single-parent home roughly doubles a child’s propensity to commit crime.”
aborted baby girls would have been the children most likely to replicate 
their own mothers’ tendencies.   53
I shall return to this idea for “compound” crime reduction in my discussion of the age 
mechanism (below). For now, I shall focus on the single parenthood mechanism.  
 The basic objection that I have for the single parenthood mechanism is that the 
percent of children growing up in single parent households increased during the relevant 
time frame.  According to Vital Statistics of the United States 1979, the number of births 54
to unmarried women increased every year from 1948 until 1979; the birth rate for 
unmarried women increased from 24.5 in 1973 to 27.8 in 1979; and the rate of divorce 
increased from 4.3 in 1973 to 5.3 in 1979.  Zimring shows that there has been an 55
uninterrupted rise in the percentage of total births to single mothers between 1965 and 
1980.  There are various explanations for this phenomenon. For example, it might be 56
argued that on the one side, women who were against abortion and/or contraceptives had 
an incentive to engage in sexual activity lest they be at a competitive disadvantage to 
other women whereas on the other side, men had less incentive to take responsibility for 
 Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 129.53
 See also James Wilson, “Dismal Science,” Commentary 120.1 (Jul/Aug, 2005): 67-9, 54
especially p. 68.
 See also Philip Cook and John Laub, “After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth 55
Violence in the United States,” Crime and Justice 29 (2002): 1-37, especially p. 21.
 Franklin Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline, ibid., p. 94 figure 4.3.56
pregnancies because legalizing abortion meant that having a baby became the physical 
choice of a woman.  By positing a causal connection between legalized abortion and the 57
increased percent of single parent households during this time period, this explanation 
inverts the single parenthood mechanism. But regardless of the explanation, the single 
parenthood mechanism is difficult to maintain in light of the increase in single parent 
households.   58
G. 
  This explanation is explored in George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen and Michael L. 57
Katz, “An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 111.2 (1996): 277-317.
 Lott and Whitley make the point more forcibly: “From the 1960s through to the late 58
1980s (the last years in which births could have any effect on crime rates during the 
1990s), there has been a tremendous increase in the rate of out-of-wedlock births. On 
average during 1965-69, only 4.8% of whites were born out of wedlock, rising to 16.1% 
20 years later (1985 to 1989). For blacks, the numbers rose from 34.9% to 61.8%...
[furthermore] unmarried women used to be much more likely to put up their children for 
adoption. In 1969 only about 28% of children born out of wedlock were being raised by 
mothers who were still unmarried within three years. By 1984, that same fraction doubled 
to 56%. Hence, before legalized abortion most of the children born out of wedlock ended 
up in families with a father” (John Lott and John Whitley, “Abortion and Crime: 
Unwanted Children and Out-of-Wedlock Births,” Economic Inquiry 45.2 (Apr., 2007): 
304-24, at 305). 
 Age. The age mechanism is similar to the single parenthood mechanism and the 
version of it offered by Donohue and Levitt was reproduced above: legalizing abortion 
decreases teenage motherhood which decreases later criminality. However, there is a key 
difference between these two mechanisms: whereas the percentage of single parent 
households increased during the relevant time frame, there are various pieces of evidence 
that militate in favor of the age mechanism. For one thing, mean age of mother was 24.4 
in 1973 and rose to 27.2 by 2000, an increase of 2.8 years.  Similarly, the 15-19 birth 59
rate decreased from 61.7 in 1973 to 51.5 in 1978 and remained in the low 50s into the 
1980s.  Finally, the percent of births to women ≤19 years old decreased steadily from 60
1973 (19.7%) to 1987 (12.4%).   61
 The objection I would like to press against the age mechanism is that teenagers who 
would be willing to get an abortion might be relevantly different from teenagers who 
 It is notable that it rose incrementally every year during that time period: there was no 59
decrease at all. See “Mean Age of Mother, 1970-2000,” National Vital Statistics Reports 
51.1 (Dec. 11, 2002), table 1.
 It increased to 53 in 1980 before decreasing back to 50.2 in 1986. The decrease 60
between 1980 and 1986 was not as steady as the decrease from 1973 to 1978. See 
“Births: Final Data for 2013,” National Vital Statistics Reports 64.1 (Jan. 15, 2015), table 
4.
 L Lu, Y Chong, BE Hamilton, SC Curtin, JA Martin, B Tejada-Vera and PD Sutton, 61
Natality trends in the United States, 1909-2013, National Center for Health Statistics, 
2015.
would not be willing to get an abortion.  Thus, although Donohue and Levitt might be 62
right that the child of a teenager who is unwilling to get an abortion is at higher risk of 
becoming a criminal, it might be the case that the child of a teenager who would be 
willing to get an abortion would not be at higher risk of becoming a criminal. In an early 
study of teens in Ventura County, California between 1972 and 1974, researchers 
demonstrated that pregnant teens with better grades, more completed schooling and not 
on public assistance were much more likely to abort than their poorer, less academically 
oriented counterparts.  Along the same lines, another study, this one based on data from 63
the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) and the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY), found that teens who abort are similar along observed 
characteristics to teens who were never pregnant, and both of these groups differ 
significantly from pregnant teens who spontaneously abort or carry to term.  These 64
selection effects are not limited to teenagers. A study including older women found that 
 This point is made originally in Ted Joyce, “Did legalized abortion lower crime?” ibid., 62
p. 26.
 Arleen Leibowitz, Marvin Eisen and Winston Chow, “An Economic Model of Teenage 63
Pregnancy Decision-Making,” Demography 23.1 (1986): 67-77. Joyce cites this article in 
Ted Joyce, “Did legalized abortion lower crime?” ibid., p. 26.
 V. Hotz, Susan McElroy and Seth Sanders, “Teenage Childbearing and Its Life Cycle 64
Consequences: Exploiting a Natural Experiment,” The Journal of Human Resources 40.3 
(2005): 683-715. Joyce cites an earlier, unpublished version of this article in Ted Joyce, 
“Did legalized abortion lower crime?” ibid., p. 26.
unmarried women who abort have more completed schooling than their counterparts who 
carry the pregnancy to term.  However, the point is that these selection effects pose a 65
problem for the age mechanism; the reason for citing the fact that the selection effects are 
found also among older women is to make more plausible the fact that they are found 
among younger women.  Additional corroboration of these selection effects can be 66
found in the fact that although the percentage of teenage births decreased during this time 
 Eve Powell-Griner and Katherine Trent, “Sociodemographic Determinants of Abortion 65
in the United States,” Demography 24.4 (1987): 553-61. This study is cited in Ted Joyce, 
“Did legalized abortion lower crime?” ibid., p. 26. In support of this point he also cites 
Janet Currie, Lucia Nixon and Nancy Cole, “Restrictions on medicaid funding of 
abortion,” Journal of Human Resources 31.1 (1995): 159-88.
 Donohue and Levitt object that these studies give the conditional probability that a 66
teenager will seek an abortion given that she has an unwanted pregnancy (John Donohue 
III and Steven Levitt, “Further Evidence That Legalized Abortion Lowered Crime: A 
Reply to Joyce,” ibid., p. 38). But this objection seems incorrect: these studies seem to 
give the conditional probability that a teenager has certain characteristics given that she 
has sought an abortion.
period, the percentage of single teenage births increased.  In 1970, approximately 30% 67
of live births to women under the age of 20 were outside marriage; by 1984, 
approximately 56% of such births were so.  This fact also seems to undermine the 68
“compound” crime reduction mechanism discussed above, which would require a 
decrease in single teenage mothers.  If the objection I am pressing is based on a correct 69
 Joyce argues that Zimring “uses national trends in fertility by age, race and martial 67
status to show that there has been a seemingly uninterrupted rise in the percent of births 
to unmarried women and teens between 1965 and 1980” (Theodore J. Joyce, “Abortion 
and Crime: A review,” ibid., 24n23). There is a subtle but important misunderstanding 
here. Zimring shows that there is an uninterrupted rise in the percent of births to 
unmarried women and in the percent of births to unmarried teens during this time period. 
However, Zimring does not show that there has been an uninterrupted rise in the percent 
of total births to teens (simpliciter) (Franklin Zimring, The Great American Crime 
Decline, ibid., p. 94 figure 4.3).
 Elizabeth C. Cooksey, “Factors in the Resolution of Adolescent Premarital 68
Pregnancies,” Demography 27.2 (May, 1990): 207-18, at 207.
 Cooksey finds a more direct problem for this mechanism: “Family structure is a 69
significant predictor only for the white sample [Cooksey has three samples: whites, 
blacks and Hispanics], for which the main effect of coming from a nonintact family is to 
enhance the likelihood of out-of-wedlock childbearing” (Elizabeth C. Cooksey, “Factors 
in the Resolution of Adolescent Premarital Pregnancies,” ibid., p. 213). This suggests that 
the compounding will be seen in at most one demographic.
interpretation of the facts, then the problem for the age mechanism is that there is an 
added layer of selection: children of teenage mothers willing to get abortions are a special 
subgroup that does not conform to the generalization that children of teenage mothers are 
at higher risk of becoming criminals.  
H. 
 Socioeconomic Status. The socioeconomic mechanism begins by noting that 
criminologists and economists have argued for a long time that there is a link between 
crime and, in particular, homicide and poverty.  However, women below the poverty line 70
 See, e.g., Colin Loftin and Robert Hill, “Regional subculture and homicide,” American 70
Sociological Review 39.7 (1974): 14-24; Victor Flango and Edgar Sherbenou, “Poverty, 
urbanization, and crime,” Criminology 14 (1976): 331-46; Robert Parker and M. Smith, 
“Deterrence, poverty, and type of homicide,” American Journal of Sociology 85 (1979): 
614-24; M. Dwayne and Robert Parker, “Type of homicide and variation in regional 
rates,” Social Forces 59 (1980): 136-47; or Kirk Williams, “Sources of Homicide: 
Reestimating the Effects of Poverty and Inequality,” American Sociological Review 49.2 
(1984): 283-9.
account for a disproportionate number of legal abortions.  For example, in 1994, 25.5% 71
of all abortions in the US were given to women from families below the federal poverty 
line. This meant that the rate of abortions for such women was 36 (per 1000 women of 
reproductive age) that year, the highest rate based on income level. (Women from 
 Levitt and Dubner argue that this was not the case for pre-Roe v. Wade illegal 71
abortions: “Before Roe v. Wade, it was predominantly the daughters of middle- or upper-
class families who could arrange and afford a safe illegal abortion. Now, instead of an 
illegal procedure that might cost $500, any woman could easily obtain an abortion, often 
for less than $100. What sort of woman was most likely to take advantage of Roe v. 
Wade? Very often she was unmarried or in her teens or poor, and sometimes all 
three” (Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 126). However, they 
do not seem to have any evidence that middle- and upper-class women accounted for a 
disproportionate number of pre-Roe v. Wade illegal abortions, and they also do not cite 
any sources for the premises underlying this argument. It is therefore perhaps worth 
pointing out that in the study gestured at in the main text above (and discussed in more 
detail below) comparing cohorts born immediately before and immediately after an 
abortion ban took effect in Romania, it was found that urban, educated women were more 
likely to have a legal abortion (i.e., prior to the ban) than their poorer counterparts 
(Cristian Pop-Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of 
Children: Evidence from Romania,” Journal of Political Economy, ibid.). This suggests 
that the reality of abortion decisions might be more complicated than the cost-benefit 
analysis proposed here by Levitt and Dubner.
families above 300% of the federal poverty line had a rate of 16 that year.) In 2000, 
26.6% of all abortions in the US were given to women from families below the federal 
poverty line, and the rate was 44, again the highest rate based on income level. (In 2000 
women from families above 300% of the federal poverty line had a rate of 10.)  By 72
2008, women from families below the federal poverty level accounted for 42.4% of all 
abortions. Their rate was 52.2. Abortion rates for other groups decreased during that 
time.  Therefore (the socioeconomic mechanism concludes) legalized abortion leads to 73
more women whose children have high probability of involvement in criminal activity 
 Rachel Jones, Jacqueline Darroch and Stanley Henshaw, “Patterns in the 72
socioeconomic characteristics of women obtaining abortions in 2000-2001,” Perspectives 
on Sexual and Reproductive Health 34.5 (2002): 226-35 and Rachel K. Jones and Megan 
Kavanaugh, “Changes in Abortion Rates Between 2000 and 2008 and Lifetime Incidence 
of Abortion,” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 117.6 (2011): 1358-66.
 Rachel K. Jones and Megan Kavanaugh, “Changes in Abortion Rates Between 2000 73
and 2008 and Lifetime Incidence of Abortion,” ibid.
getting abortions.   74
 The problem for the socioeconomic mechanism is that although childhood poverty 
does seem to have decreased in the 1960s, it does not seem to have decreased in the 
 Donohue and Levitt explain the socioeconomic mechanism in conjunction with the age 74
mechanism and the single parenthood mechanism: “…women who have abortions are 
those most at risk to give birth to children who would engage in criminal activity. 
Teenagers, unmarried women, and the economically disadvantaged are all substantially 
more likely to seek abortions [Levine et al. 1996]. Recent studies have found children 
born to these mothers to be at higher risk for committing crime in adolescence [Comanor 
and Phillips 1999]” (John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion 
on crime,” ibid., p. 381). Levitt and Dubner also group these three mechanisms together: 
“…the millions of women most likely to have an abortion in the wake of Roe v. Wade—
poor, unmarried, and teenage mothers for whom illegal abortions had been too expensive 
or too hard to get—were often models of adversity. They were the very women whose 
children, if born, would have been much more likely than average to become criminals. 
But because of Roe v. Wade, these children weren’t being born. This powerful cause 
would have a drastic, distant effect: years later, just as these unborn children would have 
entered their criminal primes, the rate of crime began to plummet” (Steven Levitt and 
Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 4).
1970s or in the 1980s. In fact, it might have increased.  According to the US Census 75
Historical Poverty Tables, the percent of related children under 18 years below poverty 
increased from 15.1% in 1969 to 16.0% in 1979 and to 17.9% in 1989.  Similarly, the 76
percent of families with related children under 18 years below poverty increased from 
11.8% in 1969 to 13.2% in 1979 to 14.9% in 1989.  A recent study published by the 77
Carsey School of Public Policy found that although the percent of children in low income 
families (family income is 200% of the federal poverty line) has decreased slightly since 
1970, the percent of children in poor families (family income is 100% of the federal 
poverty line) or in deep poverty (family income is 50% of the federal poverty line) has 
remained roughly constant or slightly increased since 1970. The study also found that 
mean family incomes of families with children in all three of the three lowest income 
quintiles have remained steady or slightly decreased since 1970 (in adjusted 2014 
 This is not to say that legalizing abortion did not enable some women in poverty to 75
terminate their pregnancies. Perhaps childhood poverty levels would have been higher in 
the 1970s and 1980s if abortion had not been legalized. But as with the other mechanisms 
discussed above, to explain an actual decrease in crime in the 1990s by means of the 
socioeconomic mechanism (as Donohue and Levitt are committed to doing), there needs 
to have been an actual decrease in childhood poverty.
 CPH-L-169, “Related children under 18 years, by poverty status in 1969, 1979, 1989, 76
and 1999 by state.”
 CPH-L-174, “Families with related children under 18 years, by poverty status in 1969, 77
1979, 1989, and 1999 by state.”
dollars). The authors summarize their findings as follows: “Overall, across the past fifty 
years [the study ends in 2013], the nation witnessed rapid declines in poverty during the 
1960s, then a period of relative stability.”  This militates against the socioeconomic 78
mechanism.   79
I. 
 Education. The final selection mechanism I shall consider is education. Donohue 
and Levitt only gesture at this mechanism in their original paper.  The mechanism is 80
 Beth Mattingly, Andrew Schaefer, Douglas Gagnon and Sarah Leonard, “Gaps in Youth 78
Opportunity by State National,” University of New Hampshire, Carsey School of Public 
Policy, Carsey Research (March 10, 2015).
 While arguing that the strong economy of the 1990s did not contribute much to the 79
decrease in crime during the 1990s, Levitt concludes that there is a “weak link between 
macroeconomics and crime” (Steven Levitt, “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 
1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not,” ibid., especially p. 
171). Levitt might be right about this. But it undermines the socioeconomic mechanism, 
which relies on a strong link between macroeconomics and crime that manifests with a 20 
year time lag, and in undermining this mechanism, this claim undermines the Donohue-
Levitt hypothesis (for which Levitt argues in the same article). It is unclear whether 
Levitt realizes this. 
 See especially John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on 80
crime,” ibid., p. 391.
endorsed more explicitly in Freakonomics.  The basic idea seems to hinge on two 81
claims. First, low maternal education is a powerful criminogenic factor. Second, low 
maternal education is one of the factors driving women to get abortions after Roe v. 
Wade.  Based on this, it may be concluded that legalizing abortion, by enabling women 82
to attain higher levels of education, decreased their potential for raising criminals and 
ultimately decreased crime. I would like to make two points about this.  
 First, although it is true that maternal education seems to have increased during this 
time period, it seems unlikely to me that this is due to the legalization of abortion. For 
one thing, Vital Statistics reports from this period reveal that the percent of children born 
to women who had completed more than 12 years of schooling began to increase prior to 
1973. For another thing, many men’s colleges began to go coed and attitudes were 
changing about women’s education around this time period. For these reasons, increasing 
levels of maternal education seem to me to be the result of a historical process that began 
before Roe v. Wade. In support of this it might be noted that at least according to recent 
studies, “would interfere with education” is not cited by many women as the most 
 See especially Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 127.81
 Donohue and Levitt also note that “[p]rior to the legalization of abortion, there was a 82
very strong link between the number of unwanted births and low maternal education over 
the period from 1965 through 1970” (John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of 
legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., p. 387).
important reason for having an abortion.  Low maternal education might not be as strong 83
a driving factor in seeking abortions as Levitt and Dubner contend.  
 Second, a recent study finds that the percentage of children living in single-parent 
families in which the parent does not have a college degree has grown steadily since 1960 
(through the 1970s and the 1980s) and at a much higher rate than the percentage of 
children living in single-parent families in which the parent had completed a bachelor’s 
or more.  This might be due to selection effects like those noted above in the discussion 84
of the age mechanism. As pointed out there, a study including older women found that 
unmarried women who abort have more completed schooling than their counterparts who 
carry the pregnancy to term. Similarly, another study finds that the effect of parental 
education on whether a pregnant teenage daughter will seek an abortion “is particularly 
strong and is pervasive regardless of race/ethnicity.”  That is, teenage daughters whose 85
 In 1987, 10% of women cited “would interfere with education or career plans” as the 83
most important reason for having an abortion, which suggests that the percent who would 
cite “would interfere with education” would be lower. In 2004, 4% of women cited this 
reason. These numbers are taken from Lawrence Finer, Lori Frohwirth, Lindsay 
Dauphinee, Susheela Singh, Ann Moore, “Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: 
Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives,” ibid., table 3.
 Beth Mattingly, Andrew Schaefer, Douglas Gagnon and Sarah Leonard, “Gaps in Youth 84
Opportunity by State National,” ibid.
 Elizabeth C. Cooksey, “Factors in the Resolution of Adolescent Premarital 85
Pregnancies,” ibid., p. 216.
parents have a high level of education seem to be more prone to seek abortion (“the 
probability of having one in a family with the highest level of parental education is more 
than 2.5 times the probability found if neither parent completed high school”).  Finally, 86
as noted above, in the Romania study (which will be discussed in more detail shortly) it 
was found that urban, educated women were more likely to have a legal abortion than 
their poorer counterparts.  But whether the growth noted in the first sentence of this 87
paragraph is due to selection effects or something else is less important for current 
purposes: the point is that the percentage of children in a high risk group relevant to the 
education mechanism (single parent household with low parent education) was growing 
rather than shrinking during the relevant time period. This presents a problem for the 
education mechanism.  
J. 
 Concluding Remarks about the Mechanisms. From this it may be seen that many of 
the independent causal mechanisms through which abortion is supposed to reduce crime 
actually give evidence that crime should have increased in the 1990s. Cohort sizes 
increased rather than decreased; the percent of single parents increased rather than 
decreased; etc. Indeed, the predictions about crime increasing in the 1990s discussed 
 Elizabeth C. Cooksey, “Factors in the Resolution of Adolescent Premarital 86
Pregnancies,” ibid., p. 216.
 Cristian Pop-Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of 87
Children: Evidence from Romania,” ibid.
above were based in part on these mechanisms.  However, Donohue and Levitt 88
concentrate their energies on explaining the different correlations that suggest a causal 
relationship rather than on the mechanisms through which this causal relationship works. 
So I turn to an examination of these correlations now.  
III. 
 In an article published one year before the original Donohue-Levitt hypothesis article, 88
Blumenstein writes, “[t]he decline [in crime] after 1980 was significantly affected by the 
shrinking size of the cohorts in the high-crime ages, but the United States in the late 
1990s was in a period of growing cohort sizes in the late teens and early twenties…Thus, 
if teenage age-specific crime rates were to remain constant, then the aggregate crime rate 
would increase as a result of the larger cohort sizes. This possibility spurred the warnings 
of a demographic ‘crime bomb’ set to go off during the 1990s” (Alfred Blumenstein, 
“Disaggregating the Violence Trends,” in Alfred Blumenstein and Joel Wallman (ed.’s) 
The Crime Drop in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 13-44, at 
28). Levitt and Dubner do seem to be aware of the warnings about this demographic 
“crime bomb” (see, e.g., Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 123; 
see also Steven Levitt, “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That 
Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not,” ibid., especially pp. 169-70). It is unclear 
whether they realize that the warnings undermine some of the mechanisms to which they 
appeal: if, e.g., someone predicts increased crime at time t2 because cohort sizes at time t1 
are increasing, then explaining the counter-predictive decrease in crime at time t2 through 
something that caused cohort sizes at time t1 to decrease is problematic.
A. 
 The Correlations. I shall divide up my discussion of the correlations into three 
subsections: international evidence; nation-level evidence; and state-level evidence. The 
international evidence subsection will focus on evidence from other countries (primarily 
Romania, Australia, Canada and the UK). The nation-level evidence subsection will focus 
on aggregate data from the US. The state-level evidence subsection will disaggregate data 
by state.  
B. 
 International Evidence. In Freakonomics, Levitt and Dubner claim that “studies of 
Australia and Canada have…established a similar link between legalized abortion and 
crime” as that proposed in the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis.  They also discuss the 89
abortion ban in Romania:  
Compared to Romanian children born just a year earlier, the cohort of 
children born after the abortion ban would do worse in every measurable 
way: they would test lower in school, they would have less success in the 
labor market, and they would also prove much more likely to become 
criminals.   90
In a blog post defending the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, Levitt lists the following as one 
 Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 129.89
 Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, ibid., p. 106.90
of the “basic facts that support the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis”: “The evidence from 
Canada, Australia, and Romania also support the hypothesis that abortion reduces 
crime.”  I shall begin by saying something about the evidence from each of the countries 91
mentioned here starting with Romania. Then I shall say something about the UK before 
concluding with some remarks about other countries.  
 There are three things that should be noted about the results from the Romania 
study. The first is that, as noted by Levitt and Dubner, the author of the study finds that 
when he controls for maternal background, children born after the abortion ban had worse 
educational and labor market achievements as adults than children born before the ban.  92
However, Levitt and Dubner do not mention that these results are conditional on 
controlling for maternal background. This leads to the second thing that should be noted 
about the result from the Romania study: when maternal background is not controlled for 
in this way, the author notes that “children born after the abortion ban attained more years 
of schooling and greater labor market success” than children born before the abortion 
ban.  The author also points out that “urban, educated women were more likely to have 93
abortions prior to the policy change, and the relative number of children born to this type 
 Steven Levitt, http://www.freakonomics.com/2005/05/15/abortion-and-crime-who-91
should-you-believe/.
 Cristian Pop-Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of 92
Children: Evidence from Romania,” ibid., p. 744.
 Cristian Pop-Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of 93
Children: Evidence from Romania,” ibid., p. 744.
of woman increased after the ban.”  But the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis is about 94
aggregate results for the cohort rather than results for subsets of the population. So the 
fact that aggregate outcomes were better is a problem.   95
 However, educational and labor market achievements are not the primary concern 
for the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, and this leads to the third and last thing that should be 
noted about the Romania study, which concerns the criminal activity of post-ban cohorts. 
The crime rate comparisons in the Romania study are different from the comparisons of 
schooling and labor market success. For crime rate comparisons, the author uses penal 
case data, which gives information about the year of birth of the persons involved (but 
does not allow for disaggregation based on socioeconomic status), to construct crime 
rates for cohorts born between 1935 and 1985. He finds that the crime rates for cohorts 
born in the three years after the ban (1967-69) were lower than those of previous cohorts. 
The author hypothesizes that “[t]he negative coefficient for the 1967-69 cohort suggests 
that the compositional changes [i.e., in the mothers carrying their pregnancies to term] 
 Cristian Pop-Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of 94
Children: Evidence from Romania,” ibid., p. 744.
 It is also perhaps worth noting that Pop-Eleches had data for and thus could control for 95
maternal background only in approximately 50% of the cases (see Cristian Pop-Eleches, 
“The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of Children: Evidence 
from Romania,” ibid., p. 751). So the result about controlling for maternal background is 
more limited than the general result about the increased educational and labor market 
success of the cohort.
have the strongest effect on crime behavior, just as in the education and labor 
regressions.”   96
 From this it may be seen that the Romania study does seem to show that abortion 
legislation can have an impact on the quality of a cohort by means of selection effects. 
But it does not do so in the direction required by the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis. Instead 
of impacting primarily uneducated women, the ban impacted primarily urban, educated 
women. Instead of resulting in a less successful cohort or higher crime rates because its 
members were subject to a criminogenic environment (e.g., abuse and resentment), the 
post-ban cohort as a whole was more successful and had a lower crime rate than the pre-
ban cohort. I turn now to the Australia study.   97
 Cristian Pop-Eleches, “The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic Outcomes of 96
Children: Evidence from Romania,” ibid., pp. 768-9. Levitt and Dubner, in reporting that 
the post-ban cohort “would also prove much more likely to become criminals,” seem to 
be referring to the 1970 cohort, which had a higher rate of criminal activity than the pre-
ban cohorts. However, given the large gap in time between the 1970 cohort and the 1966 
cohort and given everything that was happening in Romania over the relevant time span 
(manifested in the Romanian revolution in 1989), this might be the result of historical 
contingency. 
 Joyce is critical of Levitt and Dubner for calling this piece a study: “the article is little 97
more than speculation as to a possible association that includes little data and no 
analysis” (Theodore J. Joyce, “Abortion and Crime: A review,” ibid., p. 39. A similar 
claim can be found on p. 47).
 Leigh and Wolfers focus on homicide in Australia.  They provide two main pieces 98
of evidence in favor of a connection between homicide rates and abortion in Australia. 
First, the Australian homicide rate reached a peak of 2.4 (per 100,000 people) in 1988. 
Thereafter it declined, remaining below 2 for the 1990s. There was no single decision in 
Australia like Roe v. Wade (or like the Romanian abortion ban). But this was about 20 
years after a number of different decisions made abortion more readily available in 
Australia in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Second, Leigh and Wolfers provide some 99
reason to believe that the areas in which abortion was legalized first experienced drops in 
their crime rates first:  
Victoria, which legalised abortion in 1969, saw homicide decline from 
1987-88. NSW [New South Whales], where it was legalised in 1971, saw 
homicide decline from 1989-90. The Northern Territory legalised abortion 
in 1974 and saw homicide decline from 1990-91. By contrast, Western 
Australia, where the legal status of abortion remained unclear until 
 They explain their reasons for this on p. 29 (Andrew Leigh and Justin Wolfers, 98
“Abortion and Crime,” AQ: Australian Quarterly 72.4 (Aug.-Sep., 2000): 28-30, 40). It is 
perhaps worth pointing out that according to Leigh and Wolfers, although abortion rates 
increased in Australia after it was legalized, birth rates remained roughly constant (just as 
in the US). They suggest that in Australia women used abortion primarily for timing 
purposes (ibid., especially p. 29).
 Andrew Leigh and Justin Wolfers, “Abortion and Crime,” ibid., p. 29.99
recently, has not seen any significant drop in its homicide rate.  100
 However, there are two points that should be made about this. First, Leigh and 
Wolfers admit that the evidence in favor of their second point is ambiguous: “the 
evidence for other regions does not support this proposition [i.e., the proposition that 
states where abortion was legalized first experienced drops in their crime rates first]. At 
best we can say that this part of the theory holds for the states where most Australians 
live.”  Second, the crime data cited by Leigh and Wolfers (i.e., the drop in the national 101
homicide rate and the various regional homicide declines) actually might militate against 
the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis (pace Leigh, Wolfers, Donohue, Levitt and Dubner). 
Although the time-lag for the drop is suggestive, given that abortion rates increased in 
Australia after it was legalized (as in the US), the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis predicts 
that there would have been a small but prolonged decrease in crime rates. For example, 
writing in 2001 (roughly ten years after the Donohue-Levitt-hypothesis-abortion-
generated-crime-drops supposedly began), Donohue and Levitt claim that “legalized 
abortion will account for persistent declines of 1 percent a year in crime over the next two 
decades.”  This amounts to approximately 30 years of steady crime reduction. By way 102
of contrast, the crime drops in Australia, although perhaps appreciable, seem to be limited 
 Andrew Leigh and Justin Wolfers, “Abortion and Crime,” ibid., p. 30.100
 Andrew Leigh and Justin Wolfers, “Abortion and Crime,” ibid., p. 30.101
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., 102
p. 415.
to an approximately two-year time span. Thus, it seems to me that the evidence from 
Australia is equivocal.  I turn now to the Canada study.  103
 Therapeutic abortion was legalized in Canada in 1969: to receive an abortion, a 
woman would have to demonstrate in a petition that her life or health was in danger.  In 104
1988, the Canadian Supreme Court struck down the existing abortion law effectively 
legalizing elective abortion.  In his study, Sen finds that general and teen abortion rates 105
in the 1970s “are negatively and significantly correlated with trends in violent crime” in 
the 1990s.  Further checks confirm the robustness of this relationship and Sen 106
concludes that legalized abortion is responsible for approximately half of the 10% drop in 
 To be fair to Leigh and Wolfers, they do not take themselves to have established a 103
conclusive link between abortion and crime in Australia.
 Anindya Sen, “Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the 104
Relationship between Crime, Abortion, and Fertility,” The B.E. Journal of Economic 
Analysis and Policy 7.1 (2007, Article 48): 1-36, especially p. 5.
 Anindya Sen, “Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the 105
Relationship between Crime, Abortion, and Fertility,” ibid., 5n13.
 Anindya Sen, “Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the 106
Relationship between Crime, Abortion, and Fertility,” ibid., p. 20.
violent crime in Canada in the 1990s.  However, there are two things that should be said 107
about this study.  
 First, as noted already in the discussion of the wantedness mechanism, therapeutic 
abortion is relevantly different from elective abortion. Thus, caution must be exercised 
 Anindya Sen, “Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the 107
Relationship between Crime, Abortion, and Fertility,” ibid., p. 17. Sen’s analysis leads 
him to conclude that in Canada, legalizing abortion decreased crime by means of the age 
mechanism. In particular, Sen tries to show this by correlating post-1969 teen fertility 
rates with crime rates in the 1990s (see especially p. 32: “OLS estimates suggest that the 
corresponding decline in teenage fertility was responsible for more than half the decline 
in violent crime over the specific time period”). Joyce points out that the model Sen uses 
in this analysis has problems. When Joyce uses his preferred model, his results suggest 
legalized abortion increased teen fertility in Canada (Theodore J. Joyce, “Abortion and 
Crime: A review,” ibid., pp. 43-5). Joyce concludes from this that Sen’s study is “a step 
backwards in the debate” because it fails to demonstrate an association between abortion 
legalization and teen fertility, “a seemingly necessary condition for an association 
between abortion and crime” (Theodore J. Joyce, “Abortion and Crime: A review,” ibid., 
p. 45). However, I think that Joyce might be putting too much emphasis on teen fertility 
rates. As I understand it, fertility rates are used by Sen primarily to suggest a mechanism 
whereby legalized abortion decreases crime. While I agree with Joyce that there are 
problems with Sen’s support for this mechanism, I do not think it is the only possible 
mechanism.
when generalizing results from a system in which only therapeutic abortion is legal to a 
system in which elective abortion is legal (and vice versa).  Second, Sen concedes that 108
there is no correlation between abortion and property crime,  and when he divides 109
violent crime into homicide, robbery, sexual assault and physical assault, he finds that 
 Sen tries to counter this point as follows: “a good deal of evidence suggests the 108
difficulty in obtaining an abortion in Canada was quite low in most metropolitan areas by 
the time of complete U.S. legalization in nineteen seventy-three. Specifically, abortion 
applications in hospitals in most major cities were rarely denied. As well, there was a 
significant proliferation of private clinics offering similar services over the same time 
period. Finally, even if there were any problems in obtaining an abortion “close to home”, 
there was always the option of crossing the border into the United States” (Anindya Sen, 
“Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the Relationship between 
Crime, Abortion, and Fertility,” ibid., pp. 6-7). Sen might be right: obtaining an abortion 
in metropolitan areas in Canada might have been easy by 1973. But I find his evidence 
unconvincing. The fact that applications are rarely denied does not entail that they are 
being rubber-stamped: it is equally consistent with strict enforcement and women 
applying only when they have good reason. Moreover, abortion rates in Canada in the 
1970s and the 1980s are substantially lower (in some years by a multiplicative factor of 
more than 1.5) than those in the US (as reported by Sen, ibid., p. 8).
 Anindya Sen, “Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the 109
Relationship between Crime, Abortion, and Fertility,” ibid., p. 4: “abortion rates are 
insignificantly correlated with trends in property crimes.”
abortion is positively correlated with the first two and negatively correlated with the 
second two.  This suggests to me that Sen’s correlation is not tracking a causal 110
 Anindya Sen, “Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the 110
Relationship between Crime, Abortion, and Fertility,” ibid., pp. 29-31.
relationship of the kind required for the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis.  I turn now to the 111
UK study.  
 In 1968, abortion was decriminalized in England, Scotland and Wales under the 
 Sen suggests a theory to explain why the correlation does not hold for property crime: 111
he argues that the age mechanism and the birthweight mechanism predispose children to 
violent rather than to property crime (Anindya Sen, “Does Increased Abortion Lead to 
Lower Crime? Evaluating the Relationship between Crime, Abortion, and Fertility,” ibid., 
pp. 25-6). However, there are at least four things that should be said about this. First, as 
Sen admits, the evidence for his theory is “merely suggestive” (Anindya Sen, “Does 
Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the Relationship between Crime, 
Abortion, and Fertility,” ibid., pp. 26). Second, as will be seen below, the results from the 
UK study are flipped: in the UK, violent crime is positively correlated with abortion and 
property crime is negatively correlated with abortion. Third, as also will be seen below, 
Donohue and Levitt appeal to correlations between abortion and both property crime and 
violent crime. Indeed, in a blog post defending the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, Levitt 
lists the following as one of the “basic facts that support the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis”: 
“Five states legalized abortion three years before Roe v. Wade. Crime started falling three 
years earlier in these states, with property crime (done by younger people) falling before 
violent crime” (Steven Levitt, http://www.freakonomics.com/2005/05/15/abortion-and-
crime-who-should-you-believe/). Fourth and finally, Sen’s theory does not seem to be 
able to sustain his finding that abortion is negatively correlated only with two kinds of 
violent crime and positively correlated with the other two.
condition that two doctors state in good faith that continuation of the pregnancy would 
involve greater risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or 
any of her existing children than carrying the pregnancy to term.  Kahane et al. present 112
a number of pieces of evidence that militate against a connection between abortion and 
crime in the UK during this time. I shall summarize what I take to be the eight most 
important. 
 First, although property crime did begin to decline in the 1990s, its decline did not 
begin until 1992: this is prima facie too big of a gap in time (24 years compared to the 18 
year gap in the US) to support a connection with abortion.  Second, “[v]iolent crime…113
increased more or less consistently over the whole period.”  Third, plotting “cautions 114
plus guilty” data based on cohorts, they note that the 16-20 age cohort and the 21 plus age 
cohort seem to follow a similar pattern (rather than a lagged decrease with the younger 
age cohort decreasing first as one would expect if abortion cause a decrease in crime).  115
 I am simplifying for the sake of brevity the account given in Leo H. Kahane, David 112
Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence from England and 
Wales,” Economica 75.297 (Feb., 2008): 1-21, especially pp. 3-4.
 Leo H. Kahane, David Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence 113
from England and Wales,” ibid., pp. 5-6.
 Leo H. Kahane, David Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence 114
from England and Wales,” ibid., p. 6.
 Leo H. Kahane, David Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence 115
from England and Wales,” ibid., p. 6.
Fourth, comparing England/Wales and Scotland crime rates with Northern Ireland and 
Republic of Ireland crime rates, the former do not decrease relative to the latter in the 
1980s or the 1990s (in fact, the former seem to increase relative to the latter). But 
abortion remained illegal in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland during this 
time period, so if abortion had crime-reducing effects, one would expect to see these 
effects in the England/Wales and Scotland crime rates but not in the Northern Ireland or 
Republic of Ireland crime rates.  Fifth, turning to a multivariate regression like that used 116
by Donohue and Levitt (discussed below), it may be seen that in the UK, although 
property crime rates are negatively correlated with effective abortion rates, violent crime 
rates are positively correlated with effective abortion rates. Both correlations are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Sixth, although total crime rates are negatively 117
correlated with effective abortion rates, the model shows that the impact of abortion on 
crime in the UK is more than twice that in the US, which is prima facie implausible given 
that the abortion rate in the UK is consistently lower than that in the US.  Seventh, this 118
correlation does not withstand various robustness checks. For example, when London is 
removed from the data, the correlation between abortion and crime is not statistically 
 Leo H. Kahane, David Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence 116
from England and Wales,” ibid., p. 8.
 Leo H. Kahane, David Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence 117
from England and Wales,” ibid., p. 12.
 Leo H. Kahane, David Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence 118
from England and Wales,” ibid., p. 13.
significant.  Eighth and finally, when age-specific analysis is performed (i.e., looking at 119
crime rates for specific cohorts rather than aggregate crime rates) the correlations 
between offending rates and abortion rates become positive (but, to be fair, not always 
statistically significant).   120
 From this it may be seen that there are a number of prima facie contradictions in a 
Donohue-Levitt story from the international evidence. In the UK, abortion legalization is 
correlated with decreased property crime but increased violent crime; in Canada, it is 
correlated with decreased violent crime but not decreased property crime. In Canada, 
abortion legalization is correlated with increased homicide; in Australia it is correlated 
with decreased homicide. Finally, in Romania, an abortion ban is correlated with 
improved educational and labor market outcomes and decreased crime. In light of this, it 
is perhaps useful to note that in a recent study in which homicide data are plotted from 20 
countries that have legalized or substantially liberalized abortion, it is found that although 
several countries (e.g., Canada, France and Italy) are consistent with the Donohue-Levitt 
hypothesis, many show the opposite correlation: an increase in crime 20 years after 
 Leo H. Kahane, David Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence 119
from England and Wales,” ibid., pp. 13-4.
 Leo H. Kahane, David Paton and Rob Simmons, “The Abortion-Crime Link: Evidence 120
from England and Wales,” ibid., pp. 15-7. I shall return to the importance of age-specific 
analysis in the next subsection. However, it might be worth noting now that neither Sen 
nor Leigh and Wolfers were able to provide such analysis.
abortion (e.g., Denmark, Finland, Hungary and Poland).  Overlooking issues related to 121
the difference between therapeutic and elective abortion, it seems to me that the 
international evidence is not conclusively in favor of the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis: if 
this is one of the “basic facts” in its support, then there might be grounds for doubt. I turn 
now to aggregate (nation-level) data from the US.  
C. 
 Nation-Level Evidence. The main nation-level evidence in favor of the Donohue-
Levitt hypothesis comes from five characteristics of the crime drop in the 1990s: it was 
widespread, large, abrupt and persistent, and it began when the cohorts first exposed to 
legal abortion decisions in utero were entering their high-crime years.  These 122
characteristics offer disconfirmation of competing explanations and confirmation of the 
Donohue-Levitt hypothesis. For example, many cities did not improve their police forces 
but nonetheless saw large crime declines, so improving police forces cannot account for 
the widespread crime drop in the 1990s.  By way of contrast, Roe v. Wade legalized 123
abortion nationwide. Similarly, the rise in police numbers and increasing scale of 
imprisonment had been ongoing for more than a decade, so neither of these can explain 
 Angela Dills, Jeffrey Miron and Garret Summers, “What do economists know about 121
crime?”, ibid., p. 16.
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., 122
p. 380.
 John Donohue and Steven Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” ibid., 123
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the abrupt beginning to the crime drop or its timing. Again by way of contrast, Roe v. 
Wade legalized abortion in a single decision, and (again) there is consistency with the 
timing of legalizing of abortion and the subsequent drop in crime: “the peak ages in crime 
are roughly 18-24, and crime starts turning down around 1992, roughly the time at which 
the first cohort born following Roe v. Wade would hit its criminal prime.”  Moreover, 124
seven years after Roe v. Wade, more than 1.6 million abortions were being performed 
annually: thus, the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis is consistent with the size of the crime 
drop and with its persistence.  However, there are at least three pieces of nation-level 125
evidence that militate against the Donohue-Level hypothesis.  
 First, disaggregating homicide data by age reveals that there are two crime declines 
in the 1990s. Homicide rates of older cohorts (25-34, 35-49) begin to decrease in the 
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early 1990s. Homicide rates of younger cohorts begin to decrease in the late 1990s.  126
One way to see this is by noting that the average age of homicide offenders in the US 
decreased steadily from the mid-1980s until it reached a minimum in 1994.  Among the 127
younger cohorts, homicide rates of the 16-20 and 21-25 cohorts peak in 1993; the 
homicide rate of the 10-15 cohort peaks in 1994.  Robbery trends are similar: the peak 128
for the <20 cohort is in 1994.  Homicide and robbery are sometimes thought to be the 129
most reliably measured crimes because the offenses are reasonably well defined and the 
definitions have been stable over time.  I have focused on them here for that reason. But 130
it is notable that when other kinds of crime are focused on, although the stories are more 
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Science,” ibid., p. 68; James Alan Fox, “Demographics and US Homicide,” in Alfred 
Blumenstein and Joel Wallman (ed.’s) The Crime Drop in America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000): 288-317, especially pp. 302-4; and Richard 
Rosenfeld, “The case of the unsolved crime decline,” Scientific American (Feb., 2004): 
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complicated, they are nonetheless problematic for the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis. For 
example, juvenile aggravated assault rates, like robbery rates, peak in 1994. Juvenile 
simple assault rates increase until a peak in the late 1990s. Juvenile drug possession/use 
arrest rates increase sharply in the 1990s. Juvenile drug sale/manufacturing arrest rates 
increase to a peak in the second half of the 1990s. Etc.  All of this presents two 131
challenges: (1) it undermines the consistency of timing claim and (2) it undermines the 
explanation of the reductions because abortion induced crime reduction presumably 
would effect younger cohorts before effecting older cohorts. 
 A second but similar problem arises when homicide data are disaggregated by sex 
and race.  Doing so reveals that the white female homicide rate fluctuates but remains 132
roughly constant throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s for the 14-17 year old cohorts 
and the 18-24 year old cohorts. Moreover, the decreases in the homicide rates for these 
cohorts of white females in the late 1990s are inappreciable when compared to those 
associated with white or black males. Black female homicide trends show a steady 
decrease in all age groups beginning around 1991. Because abortion-reducing-crime 
effects presumably would manifest equally in both sexes (although perhaps not equally in 
both races: see the discussion of the race mechanism above) this presents a challenge for 
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the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis. Again, although the stories are more complicated, 
disaggregating rates for other kinds of crime presents similar problems.  
 Third and finally, if the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis holds, then one might expect 
that (all else being equal) crime rates in the 2000s (more than 10 years after the crime 
reducing effects of abortion supposedly began to manifest) would be lower than crime 
rates in the 1950s (when abortion was illegal and before the pill and other birth control 
mechanisms became more widely available). However, that is not the case. The US 
homicide rate (per 100,000 capita) was in the 4s in the 1950s (e.g., 4.6 in 1950); it nearly 
doubled from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, reaching a peak of 10.2 in 1980; and after 
remaining steady for some years, it has decreased to the 5s in the 2000s (e.g., 5.6 in 
2005). The homicide rate in 2000 (5.5) was lower than it has been since 1965 (5.1) but 
considerably higher than it was when it reached a local minimum of 4.0 in 1957.  Total 133
crime rates, total violent crime rates and total property crime rates tell a similar although 
more complicated story. This might lead some to suspect that in focusing on the 1990s 
crime drop, Donohue and Levitt have mistaken the nature of the phenomenon that needs 
explaining: a steady increase followed by a steady decrease in crime rather than simply a 
steady decrease.  
 Donohue and Levitt might respond to these things. For example, they plausibly 
might argue that the magnitude of the effects they predict are so small on a yearly basis 
that they easily could be overwhelmed by other effects in a simple time-series analysis; 
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that some of the trends reported above are artifacts of period effects or shifting policies; 
that trends from crimes other than homicide are not reliable; that crime-reduction effects 
of abortion should manifest more strongly in males than in females;  that getting an 134
abortion was very difficult in some states (notwithstanding Roe v. Wade), which renders 
dubious the interpretation of national trends in terms of abortion; and that all else is not 
equal in comparing homicide rates from the 1950s with homicide rates in the 2000s and 
therefore that such a comparison is not meaningful. However, in making these responses, 
Donohue and Levitt also would undercut the nation-level evidence that they cite in their 
favor. So on the whole, it seems to me that the balance of evidence from the nation-level 
goes against the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis.  
D. 
 State-Level Evidence. There are two main kinds of state-level evidence that 
Donohue and Levitt cite in support of the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis: interstate analyses 
and intrastate analyses. The interstate analyses capitalize on two main differences 
between states: timing of abortion legalization and abortion rates. I shall begin with 
interstate timing and then interstate rates. After that I shall move to intrastate analysis 
before discussing some problems with these analyses. 
 There were five “early repeal” states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York and 
 Some of the studies they cite of women whose abortion petitions were denied 134
(discussed above) show that the effects of unwantedness manifest more strongly in males 
than females. See, for example, Z. Matejcek, Z. Dytrych and V. Schuller, “Children from 
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Washington) for which elective abortion was legal in 1970, three years before Roe v. 
Wade made it legal nation-wide. However, Donohue and Levitt point out that crime 
started falling three years earlier (in the 1982-5 period) in early repeal states than in other 
states.  Moreover, the decline during this time period is in property crime rather than 135
murder or violent crime, and property crime “is disproportionately done by the young.”  136
This confirms the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis in two ways: (1) the timing is consistent 
with abortion as an explanation for the crime drops and (2) it suggests that the crime drop 
began with younger cohorts, which is what one would expect if abortion is the root cause.  
 Concerning abortion rates, Donohue and Levitt divide the 50 states and the District 
of Columbia into three equal groups based on abortion frequency: high, medium and low. 
Then they examine violent crime rates, property crime rates and homicide rates for the 
<25 cohorts and the >25 cohorts in these states from 1985 to 1997. With regard to the 
<25 cohorts, they find that the “high” abortion frequency category experiences the 
greatest decreases or smallest increases for all three categories of crime during this time 
period; the “low” category experiences the smallest decreases or greatest increases for all 
three categories of crime; and the “medium” category experiences medium decreases or 
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increases.  With regard to the >25 cohorts, they find that there is no consistent pattern. 137
This confirms the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis in two ways: (1) it directly correlates 
abortion rates of the relevant age group with crime drops and (2) by showing that the 
crime rates for the >25 cohorts do not follow the same pattern as the <25 cohorts, it 
shows that the correlation cannot be explained merely by appeal to period effects if those 
period effects would act indiscriminately on old and young alike. Donohue and Levitt 
then confirm these correlations more rigorously using panel data regressions and using a 
multivariate model that includes controls for potentially confounding factors such as 
police per 1000 residents. They also run sensitivity checks such as excluding potentially 
outlier, very high abortion states. This shows that the interstate comparison based on 
abortion frequency is robust.   138
 Moving to the intrastate analysis, Donohue and Levitt use another multivariate 
model to link abortion rates in a particular state in a particular year with the crime 
committed by the cohort born in that year while controlling for potentially confounding 
interactions.  They focus on the categories of violent crime and property crime and the 139
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analysis covers the years from 1985 to 1996. Homicide is dropped from the analysis 
because “[t]here are too few murder arrests per single age category per state.”  They 140
find that higher abortion rates around the time a cohort is born are associated with lower 
arrest rates in their teens and twenties.  This further confirms the Donohue-Levitt 141
hypothesis because it shows that within a given state, the cohorts most effected by 
abortion go on to commit the least crime.  
 However, there are a number of problems with these analyses. I shall begin by 
mentioning a few that Donohue and Levitt have responded to. After explaining the 
responses, I shall discuss some problems that might not be soluble.  
 Foote and Goetz have shown that a coding error in the data used for the original 
paper resulted in the intrastate analysis being incorrect.  Similarly, Joyce has leveled a 142
suite of objections to the abortion data used in these analyses. For one thing, he notes that 
in their original article, Donohue and Levitt assume for the purposes of their statistical 
analysis that there were no abortions prior to legalization. Joyce points out that (1) this 
assumption is false (Kansas had an observed abortion ratio of 369 per 1,000 live births in 
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1972 (in 1973, its ratio was 414 per 1,000 live births)) and (2) this false assumption 
introduces bias into their equation.  For another thing, he prefers to use abortion data 143
from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and an algorithm used by the Alan 
Guttmacher Institute (AGI) for assigning abortions by state of residence to the raw AGI 
data used by Donohue and Levitt.  He also argues that abortion is not a good proxy for 144
unwantedness and that to test for a link between abortion and crime, “[t]he abortion rate 
should be inversely related to fertility rates.”   145
 In response to Foote and Goetz, Donohue and Levitt have shown that the results 
from their intrastate analysis still stand once the coding error is corrected.  In response 146
to Joyce, Donohue and Levitt argue that the bias introduced by assuming there were no 
abortions prior to 1973 would undermine the correlation between abortion and crime: the 
fact that the correlation is still there despite the bias indicates its robustness. To 
demonstrate this, they show that if they estimate pre-1973 abortion rates by linear 
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backcasting, they get the same results.  Furthermore, they show that using CDC data 147
does not undermine their results.  Finally, they note that most of their mechanisms 148
(because they are selection mechanisms) do not require an inverse relationship between 
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abortion rates and fertility rates.   149
 But there are at least three problems with the analyses presented above that might 
not have answers that ultimately hold up. First, the interstate timing analysis is in tension 
with the intrastate analysis. Donohue and Levitt note that the intrastate analysis shows 
that the smallest impact of abortion appears to occur in the under 17 age range.  But in 150
the 1982-1985 period relied on for the interstate timing analysis, most of the early repeal 
cohorts would have been under 17. Thus, if the intrastate analysis is held firm, it renders 
prima facie implausible the claim that the early drop in property crime (which falls by 
8.3%) in early repeal states is the result of abortion legalization.  
 Second, although the intrastate rate analysis is suggestive, Foote and Goetz point 
out that extending the analysis backward in time shows that there is a “pre-1985 
relationship between abortion and crime.”  It is implausible that there was a causal 151
relationship between abortion rates and crime rates prior to 1985 because the cohorts 
would have been too young (less than 12 years old in non-early repeal states). So this 
suggests that the correlation between abortion rates and crime rates after 1985 is spurious 
(or perhaps tracking an omitted variable that drives both abortion rates and crime rates). 
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Donohue and Levitt perform various additional tests that suggest that there is no omitted 
variable.  But it is perhaps worth noting in this regard that when individual states are 152
plotted to find a correlation between crime rates and abortion rates (rather than 
aggregated into three groups based on whether they are in the top, middle or lowest 17), 
there is no obvious relationship.   153
 Third and finally, Donohue and Levitt use arrest numbers rather than arrest rates in 
their intrastate analysis.  This is a problem because Foote and Goetz point out that using 154
arrest rates undermines the intrastate results. In response, Donohue and Levitt suggest 
that using arrest numbers as opposed to arrest rates can distinguish between cohort size 
and selection effect mechanisms. After redoing their analysis with this in mind, they find 
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that “at least 40% of the measured impact of abortion on arrests is operating through the 
selection channel.”  Subsequent studies have duplicated this result. For example, 155
Ananat et al. note that “our results align with the previous literature in that reduced 
abortion costs led to reduced crime, but largely through a reduction in cohort size (total 
crime) rather than through selection (crime per capita).”  But as pointed out in the first 156
half of this paper, very little of the impact of abortion in the 1970s on arrests in the 1990s 
can be operating through the cohort size channel: cohort sizes were increasing rather than 
decreasing in the 1990s. This suggests that the correlation might not be tracking a causal 
mechanism. It is perhaps worth noting in this regard that if one looks at homicide rates 
for 16 year olds, 17 year olds, 18 year olds, 19 year olds and 20 year olds, in nonrepeal 
states or repeal states, it may be seen that they all follow a similar trend. In particular, 
they all climb rapidly after 1987 and decline rapidly after 1995. This seems to undermine 
the consistency of timing claim (e.g., 16 year old homicide rates in nonrepeal states 
increase rather than decrease approximately 16 years after Roe v. Wade). It also seems to 
undermine the mechanism because the decrease in crime among younger cohorts is 
roughly uniform rather than staggered (i.e., with 16 year olds decreasing first followed by 
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17 year olds, etc.), which is more consistent with period effects than abortion.   157
 It might be argued that the raw data gestured toward in the final sentences of the 
previous two paragraphs is not as informative as the more rigorous regression analyses 
performed by Donohue and Levitt. But it also might be argued that these regression 
analyses obfuscate rather than reveal the facts.  In light of this, it seems to me that the 158
state-level evidence is suggestive but inconclusive. 
IV. 
 Conclusion. The balance of evidence at the international evidence seems to me to 
militate against the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis as does the balance of evidence at the 
national level. The state level evidence is suggestive but inconclusive. Furthermore, the 
independent evidence for many if not all of the mechanisms that have been advanced to 
support the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis seems unpersuasive. In fact, many of these 
mechanisms would have predicted increased (rather than decreased) crime rates in the 
1990s. Thus, it seems to me that the conclusion that ought to be drawn at present is that 
the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis is false. 
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